


# Basel II, Basel III Orientation

Understanding the  
Evolution of bank capital regulation  
[FinanceTrainingCourse.com](http://FinanceTrainingCourse.com)



# DILBERT®

BY  
SCOTT ADAMS



DILBERT, YOU'LL ABSORB  
BILL'S PROJECT WHEN  
HE TRANSFERS.



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DON'T WORRY; HE'LL  
TELL YOU EVERYTHING  
YOU NEED TO KNOW.



THE WHATCHAMACALLIT  
HAS TO BE WHATEVER  
OR ELSE THE WHOSITS  
WILL GO HEY-HEY.



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NOW THIS IS EITHER  
THE BUDGET TOTAL OR  
A FAX NUMBER.



IT'S ABSOLUTELY CRITI-  
CAL THAT YOU... UM...  
I LOST MY TRAIN OF  
THOUGHT.



6-30-04

DO YOU HAVE A LIST  
OF KEY CONTACTS?

THAT WOULD  
HAVE BEEN  
A GOOD IDEA.



CAN I CALL YOU IF  
I HAVE QUESTIONS?

YOU CAN  
TRY.




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
I LOVE MY CO-  
WORKERS, UNTIL  
THEY TALK.



# Regulation



# Regulation




# Capital

# Capital Attribution

# Core Issue




# Capital





# Capital & Distribution

## Distribution of Portfolio Value




# Capital & Distribution

Regulator,  
Shareholders

Depositors,  
Counterparties,


Rating Agencies




# Implementation

- Which capital?
  - regulatory or economic or both
- Calculation engine
  - Data
  - Assumptions
  - Correlation
- Application
  - RAROC or not?

# ICAAP - Framework




# ICAAP Report Structure




# Challenges

# The distribution




# Effectiveness






# Behaviour



# Dissection



# Issues

# Policy

- Group structure
- Responsibility
- Process
  - Capital attribution
  - Risk Appetite
- Distribution List, Frequency
- Content

# Capital = ?

- Credit risk
- Market risk
- Operation Risk
- Interest rate gap - ?
- Liquidity risk - ?
- Concentration - ?
- For strategic risk - ?
- For other residual risks - ?

# Capital = Regulatory

- Credit risk → Standardized or IRB
- Market risk → Standardized or IMA
- Operation Risk → Basic Indicator

# Capital = Regulatory

- Interest rate gap - nil
- Liquidity risk - nil
- Concentration - nil
- For strategic risk - nil
- For other residual risks - nil

# Capital = Economic

- Credit risk → Earnings at Risk
- Market risk → IMA
- Operation Risk → Basic Indicator



# Capital = Economic

- Interest rate gap – Earnings at Risk
- Liquidity risk – Exposure based
- Concentration – add on charge
- For strategic risk – scenario based
- For other residual risks - nil

# Aggregation

- Additive
- Impact of correlation
- Across related areas
- Across unrelated areas
- Modeling correlation
- Top down approach
- Bottom up approach

# Value addition

- Economic capital
- Loan pricing
- Risk Adjusted Return on Capital
- Transfer Pricing
- Risk appetite
- Risk is half the equation

# Anatomy of a liquidity crisis

## Basel III Adjustments

# Name Crisis

**Change in market  
conditions**


**Operational  
Loss**

**Asset  
related Loss**


**Regulatory  
scandal**

**Accounting  
Scandal**


# Liquidity Crisis



# Financial Inst. Business Model




# FI Business Model






# Asset Sales



# Liquidity Crisis



# Cash Generation

## Asset Sales

- Repurchase agreements
- Discount window
- Outright sale at depressed prices
- Off market settlement for netting off liabilities


## Cash Generation

- Secured Term loans
- Equity Injection
- Asset Swap for Cash
- Regulatory driven cash injection or take over

## Cash conservation


- Realignment and restructuring of resources
- Discontinued operations
- Limit management
- Centralization of cash management

# Bear Stearns



# Lehman

9<sup>th</sup> June: \$45 billion in liquidity, 20% reduction risky assets, leverage from 31:1 to 25:1.  
Survived March Bear fallout. Raised US\$ 10 billion through capital issues in April/June



# Bear Stearns Case Study

- 20 December 2007:** BS records 4th quarter loss, writes down mortgage assets of \$1.9 billion. Sued by Barclays
- 28 December 2007:** Employees sell BS stock worth \$ 20 million
- Early January 2008:** CEO James Cayne resigns. Moody's downgrade of MBS tranches issued by BS
- Mid-January 2008:** Over 20% fall in BS share price
- 7 March 2008:** Shares of Carlyle Capital Corporation (CCC) (BS has significant exposure), suspended. **Triggers concerns regarding liquidity**
- 10 March 2008:** BS Press Release to reassure investors that liquidity concerns are false. Rumors of loss of confidence and credit facilities.
- 11 March 2008:** CFO says rumors false. Goldman Sach's says it will not stand in for it clients for derivative deals with BS
- 12 March 2008:** CEO says no liquidity crisis on CNBC, quarter will show profit. Banks withdraw credit lines, clients stop using BS brokerage
- 13 March 2008:** CCC hedge fund collapses. BS share price falls 17%. CEO announces all is well. Liquidity falls from \$17 billion to \$2 billion.
- 13 March 2008:** CEO approaches JP Morgan for rescue package and clients to express confidence in BS publicly. Latter declined.
- 14 March 2008:** BS says JP Morgan with Fed Reserve has agreed to provide funding. Share price falls 40%. S&P and Moody's cut BS ratings
- 16 March 2008:** JP Morgan announces that they have acquired BS for \$2 per share

# Lehman Case Study

- **13<sup>th</sup> March 2007:** Stock market suffers largest one-day drop in 5 years on reports that Lehman's profitability would be significantly impacted because of rising subprime mortgage delinquencies.
- **14<sup>th</sup> March 2007:** Lehman reports record revenues and profits for its first fiscal quarter.
- **August 2007:** Announces closing of subprime mortgage originator BNC Mortgage cutting 1200 jobs. Also closes down offices of Alt-A originator offices in a number of states.
- **13<sup>th</sup> December 2007:** Reports record net income for the year of \$4.2 billion and revenue of \$19.3 billion.
- **17<sup>th</sup> January 2008:** Stops originating mortgages through its wholesale channels.
- **17<sup>th</sup> March 2008:** Share price declines sharply by more than 48% following the collapse of Bear Stearns
- **18<sup>th</sup> March 2008:** Reports better than expected reported profits for the first fiscal quarter. Share prices rise to recover value lost the previous day.
- **1<sup>st</sup> April 2008:** Announces that it has raised \$4 billion in preferred stock.
- **15<sup>th</sup> April 2008:** Lehman's CEO Richard Fuld tells investors that worst of credit crisis is over but financial environment would remain challenging.

# Lehman – Cont.

- **9<sup>th</sup> June 2008:** Lehman announces first quarterly loss of \$3 billion since becoming a public company. Also announces sale of \$6 billion in stock to raise capital, an increased liquidity position of \$45 billion, a 20% reduction in residential and commercial mortgages exposure and a reduced leverage ratio of 25 to 1.
- **19<sup>th</sup> August 2008:** Share price falls by 13% on reports that 3-quarter results would be impacted by significant asset write downs
- **22<sup>nd</sup> August 2008:** Stock price recovers on negotiations with state-controlled Korean Development Bank.
- **2<sup>nd</sup> September 2008:** New reports indicate that KDB would purchase a 25% stake in Lehman.
- **8<sup>th</sup> September 2008:** Lehman's share price falls sharply on reports that KDB talks are on hold.
- **9<sup>th</sup> September 2008:** New reports indicate talks with KDB have ended. Lehman's share price falls by 45%. Liquidity dries up as hedge fund clients start pulling out, lines of credit are withdrawn, calls for more margin/ collateral increase and trades with Lehman are cancelled.
- **10<sup>th</sup> September 2008:** Lehman reports third quarter results, a loss of \$3.2 billion with asset write-downs amounting to \$5.6 billion. Stock price declines by 7%. Moody's announces potential credit ratings downgrade.
- **11 - 12<sup>th</sup> September 2008:** Lehman's stock declines a further 42% as it struggles to find a buyer. BofA and Barclays comes forward.
- **13<sup>th</sup> - 14<sup>th</sup> September 2008:** Bids by both parties end as US government insists that it will not provide assistance.
- **15<sup>th</sup> September 2008:** Lehman files for bankruptcy protection. Dow Jones suffers its largest drop since 11th September 2001.



# Group Assignment

The Libor Crisis and Probability of  
Default for LIBOR Banks  
Due Wednesday 10 am

## The Usual Suspects

Submitting Bank	Market Cap / Equity Base (USD Billions)	Pretax Income (USD Billions)
Bank of America	230	1
JP Morgan Chase	184	19
HSBC	136	22
The Royal Bank of Scotland Group	116	(1)
Bank of Tokyo- Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd	108	7
Barclays Bank plc	101	9
Citibank NA	77	11
Lloyds Banking Group	72	4
Deutsche Bank AG	69	6
Royal Bank of Canada	69	7
Credit Agricole CIB	64	(2)
Société Générale	61	3
Rabobank	58	4
UBS AG	57	4
The Norinchukin Bank	53	2
BNP Paribas	48	8
Credit Suisse	32	29
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation Europe Ltd (SMBCE)	2	0

Source: Public Data. Compiled by FinanceTrainingCourse.com

# Assignment – 48 hours

- Estimate trailing PD's using the structured approach for the following 6 banks
- Barclays
- BAML
- HSBC
- JP Morgan Chase
- Royal Bank of Canada
- RaboBank

# Need


- Trailing Volatility estimates for last 2 years for the 6 banks
- Total Assets, Total Equity, Total Liability
- Due date. Wednesday 10 am
- Calculate Prob. Of Default using
- Structured Approach

# BASEL III – LIQUIDITY RISK FRAMEWORK


# Basel III reforms



# Monitoring tools




# Basel III - Liquidity Framework





# Basel III – Liquidity Framework



# LCR Summary

**LCR = Value of stock of high-quality liquid assets in stressed conditions / Total net cash outflows  $\geq$  100%**

Implementation  
date - 2015

Inventory of  
liquid assets

30 calendar day  
severe liquidity  
stress

Supervisory  
stress testing

# NSFR Summary

**NSFR = Available amount of stable funding/  
Required Amount of stable funding  $\geq$  100%**

Effective 2018

Longer term  
liquidity risk  
profile

1 year horizon  
under  
conditions of  
extended firm-  
specific stress

Short term  
structural  
funding  
liquidity  
mismatches

# Metrics - Summary

## Contractual maturity mismatch

- Maturity gaps for each maturity time band

## Concentration of funding

- Whole sale funding concentration by significant counterparty, product/ instrument/ currency

## Available unencumbered assets

- By amount, currency, type, location


## LCR by significant currency

## Market-related monitoring tools


# IMPACT ASSESSMENT

# Sample LCR's


## LCR



# Sample NSFR




# Liquid Stock / MCCO







# Stable funding/Required Funding




# Breakdown of Gross Int. Inc.




# Side by side comparison




## LCR



# Side by side comparison



## NSFR



# Conclusion

- LCR
  - High interest, low growth scenario
  - Implementation? Relative basis?
  - 2015 is/should be quite doable
  - Possibly push sooner
  - Reservations?
- NSFR
  - Hitting the core business model
  - Significant resistance
  - Alternate liquidity and funding instruments?
  - 2018 ?

# Basel II – Technology

09 Sep 2005

# Expectations

- Process
  - Questions – from the audience
  - Answers – from the panel

# Vendor Challenges

- The skill set & expertise challenge
- The political challenge
- The system & technology challenge
- The interpretation challenge



# The skill set and expertise challenge

1. Just Statistics & Modeling
2. Just Finance
3. Just Banking (traditional, core, non-core)
4. Just Change management
5. Just Regulation
6. Certification – bookish knowledge versus experience or intuition

# The system & tech challenge

1. What was the price again?
2. When did you say you could implement this solution?
3. Competition?
4. Moving specs & Ongoing development
5. Part consulting, Part implementation, Part trouble shooting
6. Data set integrity
7. Number validation
8. Profile & Visibility

# System & Tech challenges

- The stages
- Discovery & Analysis – 3 - 6 months
- Business Case – 8 - 12 weeks
- Change management – On going
- Product mapping – 4 - 8 weeks
- Data Interface – 6 - 8 weeks
- System configuration – 8 weeks
- Pre live run – 6 - 12weeks
- Live

# System & Tech challenges

- Team structure
  - Domain expert
    - Basel expertise
    - Number validator
    - Banking / Regulatory requirements
  - Development team
  - Client Partner / Account Manager
  - Implementation team
  - Quality Assurance

# The political challenge

1. The business case challenge
2. Treasury Operations
3. Credit Risk Management
4. Firm wide Risk
5. New blood versus old team
6. Board interaction
7. Board responsibility
8. Reporting time frames, lines & mandate

# The political challenge

1. Data ownership?
2. Regulatory Compliance or Risk Management?
3. Whose neck is it anyways?
4. Is it a step up or step down?

# The interpretation challenge - II


1. How do I put them to work?
2. How much is enough?
3. How much is acceptable?
4. How do I explain these to my board?
5. Where do we go from here?
6. What is the worst that can happen?
7. What if I breach the numbers?

# The interpretation challenge - I

1. What do the numbers mean?
2. Value at Risk?
3. Volatility?
4. Monte Carlo simulation?
5. Capital Adequacy?



# Framework



# Game Plan

- Anatomy of a Liquidity Crisis
- The Basel III – Liquidity adjustments
  - Framework
- Impact and implications
  - Liquidity
  - Profitability
  - Stress Testing

# PD Models

# Overview of PD Models

1. KMV – Market Price Model / Merton Model
2. Z Score driven PD – Application Score
3. Credit Spread driven Loss Norms
4. Provisions Data based Loss Norms
5. **Payment Behavior – Cohort or Mortality Model**

# Overview of PD Models

1. KMV – Market Price Model (**limited application**)
2. Z Score driven PD – (**data set specific**)
3. Credit Spread driven Loss Norms (**not PD**)
4. Market Data based Loss Norms (**not PD**)
5. **Payment Behavior – Cohort or Mortality Model**

# Approach

# Process

- Data set (selection)
- Rescore (standard)
- Pool (bucket)
- Behavior (Default event)
- Results / Test (Robustness)
- Report (Results)

# Key Terms

- Credit Update
- Credit Event
- Probability of Default (PD)
- Internal PD
- Regulatory PD
- Credit Score
- Scoring Engine
- Feedback Loop



# Key Concepts

- Probability of Default


$$P(\text{Default}) = \frac{\text{Amount Outstanding for Credit Events}}{\text{Amount Outstanding for All Updates}}$$

$$P(\text{Default}) = \frac{\text{Number of Credit Events}}{\text{Number of Updates}}$$

- Credit Event / Credit Updates
- Scoring Engine  $\longleftrightarrow$  PD
- Repayment data by product

# Default / Credit Event

← Trackable with payment data →



# PD 1.0

Credit Events														
Aggregate Score Range		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Total
90	100	-	2	2	1	1	1	3	6	3	2	2	1	24
80	90	-	3	5	2	2	2	3	3	3	4	4	5	36
70	80	-	7	3	4	4	5	3	2	3	2	3	4	40
60	70	-	5	5	6	5	7	4	2	3	5	2	3	47
50	60	-	7	4	5	7	7	4	2	3	5	6	7	57
40	50	-	9	6	8	9	9	3	5	8	5	8	5	75
30	40	-	10	5	6	9	11	9	10	6	7	8	9	90
20	30	-	11	9	6	8	11	6	13	9	7	6	8	94
10	20	-	11	13	12	9	15	5	8	9	9	13	11	115
-100	10	-	14	13	12	15	10	11	12	16	16	13	11	143


  

Total Updates														
Aggregate Score Range		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Total
90	100	34	21	23	12	34	32	21	13	32	23	42	12	299
80	90	32	23	44	52	32	43	54	23	43	52	13	32	443
70	80	22	31	41	30	29	48	43	60	40	53	45	35	477
60	70	28	29	43	53	43	54	49	56	47	55	53	36	546
50	60	55	67	54	74	55	45	55	36	53	43	55	41	633
40	50	67	64	62	45	76	88	69	52	65	63	86	75	812
30	40	56	63	67	74	72	77	77	81	91	90	91	90	929
20	30	67	69	76	84	111	95	87	60	81	77	76	78	961
10	20	123	124	107	104	97	94	93	95	77	73	69	58	1,114
-100	10	99	93	96	68	93	107	89	94	128	125	113	76	1,181

# PD 2.0

Probability of Default														
Aggregate Score Range		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Total
90	100	0.00%	9.52%	8.70%	8.33%	2.94%	3.13%	14.29%	46.15%	9.38%	8.70%	4.76%	8.33%	8.03%
80	90	0.00%	13.04%	11.36%	3.85%	6.25%	4.65%	5.56%	13.04%	6.98%	7.69%	30.77%	15.63%	8.13%
70	80	0.00%	22.58%	7.32%	13.33%	13.79%	10.42%	6.98%	3.33%	7.50%	3.77%	6.67%	11.43%	8.39%
60	70	0.00%	17.24%	11.63%	11.32%	11.63%	12.96%	8.16%	3.57%	6.38%	9.09%	3.77%	8.33%	8.61%
50	60	0.00%	10.45%	7.41%	6.76%	12.73%	15.56%	7.27%	5.56%	5.66%	11.63%	10.91%	17.07%	9.00%
40	50	0.00%	14.06%	9.68%	17.78%	11.84%	10.23%	4.35%	9.62%	12.31%	7.94%	9.30%	6.67%	9.24%
30	40	0.00%	15.87%	7.46%	8.11%	12.50%	14.29%	11.69%	12.35%	6.59%	7.78%	8.79%	10.00%	9.69%
20	30	0.00%	15.94%	11.84%	7.14%	7.21%	11.58%	6.90%	21.67%	11.11%	9.09%	7.89%	10.26%	9.78%
10	20	0.00%	8.87%	12.15%	11.54%	9.28%	15.96%	5.38%	8.42%	11.69%	12.33%	18.84%	18.97%	10.32%
-100	10	0.00%	15.05%	13.54%	17.65%	16.13%	9.35%	12.36%	12.77%	12.50%	12.80%	11.50%	14.47%	12.11%

# Feedback Loop




# Feedback 1.0

Interest Coverage			PD	Sales Growth			PD	Leverage			PD
-10.00	-5.00	5.26%		-100.0%	0.0%	5.45%		-1.00	0.20	3.38%	
-5.00	0.00	1.28%		0.0%	10.0%	6.18%		0.20	0.50	5.53%	
0.00	5.00	6.48%		10.0%	20.0%	5.03%		0.50	0.70	5.93%	
5.00	10.00	4.59%		20.0%	30.0%	8.97%		0.70	1.00	6.89%	
10.00	15.00	5.99%		30.0%	40.0%	5.88%		1.00	1.20	10.00%	
15.00	20.00	5.51%		40.0%	50.0%	0.00%		Sector		PD	
20.00	25.00	1.49%		50.0%	70.0%	5.47%		SME		5.04%	
25.00	30.00	1.33%		70.0%	100.0%	3.48%		Corporate		3.85%	
30.00	35.00	0.00%		100.0%	200.0%	5.67%		Current Ratio		PD	
35.00	40.00	9.09%		200.0%	300.0%	3.77%		0.00	2.00	5.44%	
40.00	45.00	0.00%		300.0%	400.0%	2.00%		2.00	3.00	4.89%	
45.00	50.00	0.00%		400.0%	500.0%	5.00%		3.00	4.00	3.35%	
50.00	100.00	0.00%						4.00	5.00	3.10%	
								5.00	7.00	2.50%	

# PD Snapshot


Score Range		Updates	Events	PD
81	100	574	14	2.40%
61	80	535	7	1.28%
41	60	2,679	53	1.98%
21	40	1,985	28	1.42%
0	20	604	3	0.42%

# Score Distribution





# PD Distribution



# PD 3.0

CUSTOMER  
PROFILE

Basic Attributes &  
Financials

PAYMENT  
BEHAVIOR

Amounts & Status

Customer Score

Credit Event

Probability of  
Default

# PD 4.0

CUSTOMER  
SNAPSHOT

CUSTOMER  
FINANCIALS

PAYMENT  
BEHAVIOR

FACILITY  
INFORMATION

Customer  
Score

Credit Event

Probability of  
Default

# PD 5.0

CUSTOMER  
SNAPSHOT

CUSTOMER  
FINANCIALS

PAYMENT  
BEHAVIOR

FACILITY  
INFORMATION

Scoring Engine

Customer  
Score

Updates

Default  
Definition

Credit Event

Probability of  
Default

# Re-scoring engine

Customer Financials

Customer Profile

Determine  
Scoring Elements

Assign Sector Specific Weights  
to Scoring Elements

COMPUTE  
SCORING  
ELEMENTS

Mapping

CUSTOMER  
SCORE

Compute sector  
specific scoring  
elements for each  
customer

Map scoring  
elements to rating  
scores


For elements 1 to  
 $n$ ,  $\Sigma$  scores for all  
weighted elements

# Transition Matrix

Others												
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	-	-	152.21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	-	-	-	46.04	-	-	-	-	-	1.30	-	141.44
5	-	-	-	-	31.35	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.39
6	-	-	-	-	-	0.44	56.65	-	-	-	-	-
7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.32


# Challenges

# Project Scope






# The Pooled PD vision



# Data & Process



# Merton's

2/25/2013

 **Finance**  
Training Course

**FOURQUANTS**  
DECODE FINANCE

 **alchemy**  
Analysts, Actuaries.

 **iPad Risk Books**  
*finance rockstars*

# Merton PD Model Mapping

## Spot Price

- Spot price of Firm Assets
- Market Value of Firm Assets

## Strike Price

- Book Value of Firm Debt

## Volatility

- Volatility of Assets
- Volatility of Equities – MV of Equities

## Time

- 1 year? Term of loan or firm liabilities

## Risk Free Rate

- Risk Free Rate



$$c(S, t) = SN(d_1) - Xe^{-r(T-t)}N(d_2)$$

where:

$N(\cdot)$

distribution function for a standard Normal (i.e.  $N(0,1)$ )


# Merton's

Equity =

$V * N(d1) -$

$\exp(-rt) * D * N(d2)$

# EDF/Structural Approach



# Merton PD Equation

$$V_E = V_A N(d1) - e^{-rT} X N(d2)$$

where

$V_E$  is the market value of the firm's equity,

$$d1 = \frac{\ln\left(\frac{V_A}{X}\right) + \left(r + \frac{\sigma_A^2}{2}\right)T}{\sigma_A \sqrt{T}},$$


$$d2 = d1 - \sigma_A \sqrt{T}, \text{ and}$$

$r$  is the risk free interest rate.

$$\sigma_E = \frac{V_A}{V_E} \Delta \sigma_A$$



# Call Option



## The Usual Suspects


Submitting Bank	Market Cap / Equity Base (USD Billions)	Pretax Income (USD Billions)
Bank of America	230	1
JP Morgan Chase	184	19
HSBC	136	22
The Royal Bank of Scotland Group	116	(1)
Bank of Tokyo- Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd	108	7
Barclays Bank plc	101	9
Citibank NA	77	11
Lloyds Banking Group	72	4
Deutsche Bank AG	69	6
Royal Bank of Canada	69	7
Credit Agricole CIB	64	(2)
Société Générale	61	3
Rabobank	58	4
UBS AG	57	4
The Norinchukin Bank	53	2
BNP Paribas	48	8
Credit Suisse	32	29
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation Europe Ltd (SMBCE)	2	0

Source: Public Data. Compiled by FinanceTrainingCourse.com

# Assignment – 48 hours

- Estimate trailing PD's using the structured approach for the following 6 banks
- Barclays
- BAML
- HSBC
- JP Morgan Chase
- Royal Bank of Canada
- RaboBank

# Probability of Default (Merton)



# Probability of Default (Merton)

